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Abstract 
In  this  paper  we  explore  whether  low  rates  of  sustained  technology  use  can  be  explained  by 
heterogeneity  in  returns  to  adoption.    To  do  so  we  evaluate  impacts  of  the  Cocoa  Abrabopa 
Association, which provided a package of fertilizer and other inputs on credit to cocoa farmers in 
Ghana.  High estimated average productive impacts for treated farmers are found to be consistent 
with  negative  economic  profits  for  a  substantial  proportion  of  the  treated  population.    By 
constructing an individual specific measure of returns, we demonstrate that low realized returns 
among adopters are associated with low retention rates, even after conditioning on output levels 
and successful repayment.  The results are consistent with the hypothesis that high average returns 
mask substantial and persistent heterogeneity, and that farmers experiment in order to learn about 
their idiosyncratic returns.  (JEL codes: O13, O33, Q12, Q16) 
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What constrains investment in agricultural technologies?  This question is important – and stubbornly 
persistent – in development economics.  Not only does agriculture continue to represent the primary 
source of income for many of the world’s poor, but low adoption rates of agricultural technologies, such 
as fertilizers and improved seed varieties, have accompanied the stagnation of agricultural productivity 
in Africa in particular (World Bank 2008).   
There is little dispute that there exist agricultural technologies with high expected returns in many Sub 
Saharan contexts.  This view is supported by a growing body of evidence.  Notably, Esther Duflo, Michael 
Kremer and Jonathan Robinson report experimental evidence of a mean seasonal return of 36 percent 
to fertilizer use among maize farmers in the Busia District of Kenya (Duflo et al. 2008).  And yet rates of 
fertilizer use are low:  fewer than 24 percent of farmers in Duflo and coauthors’ study had used fertilizer 
in the preceding year.  Even where supposedly high return technologies do get adopted, many farmers 
abandon them.  In a distinct sample of Kenyan maize farmers, Tavneet Suri documents that 30 percent 
of farmers switch into and out of the use of hybrid seeds in a given year (Suri 2007).  In Ethiopia, Stefan 
Dercon and Luc Christiansen find that, while only 22 percent of farmers use fertilizer in a given year, a 
further 14 percent of farmers in the final round of their survey were not using fertilizer in spite of having 
done so in previous survey rounds (Dercon & Christiaensen 2007).  Low rates of adoption and lack of 
sustained use of the technology combined with high rates of return to those technologies  therefore 
present a puzzle. 
Several mechanisms have been put forward to explain observed patterns of agricultural technology 
adoption.  Processes of social learning have been much studied (Bandiera & Rasul 2006, Conley & Udry 
2010, Foster & Rosenzweig 1995, Munshi 2004).  If social learning is sufficiently important, low adoption 
equilibria may persist in spite of potentially high returns.  Alternative theories include credit and supply 
side constraints (Moser & Barrett 2006, Zerfu & Larson 2010).  In Kenya, Duflo and co authors find 
evidence consistent with the view that time inconsistency in farmers’ preferences causes inefficient 
adoption decisions (Duflo et al. 2009).   
While they do address important elements of observed adoption patterns, these theories are generally 
not well equipped to explain why adoption is not sustained.  In the most common form of learning 
model, for example, farmers only adopt technologies when they know how to use them effectively, and 
this knowledge, once acquired, is never lost (Foster & Rosenzweig 1995, Jovanovic & Nyarko 1996).  
Likewise, instability in the supply of inputs alone seems an ad hoc explanation, and one incapable of 
explaining the widespread failure of farmers to persistently adopt profitable technologies even in cases 
where farmers have accessed them in the past.  One exception is Dercon and Christiaensen (2007), who 
argue that year to year variation in the ability of households to bear risks associated with high return 
technologies may explain instability in their use.  Even so, if the typical farmer experiences such high 
returns as have been reported in the literature – a premise that we revisit in this paper – one would 
expect such technologies, once established, to pay for themselves.  Indeed, these stylized facts lead 3 
 
Duflo to assert that “prima facie, neither limited liability nor risk aversion seem capable of explaining 
such a low level of fertilizer use” (Duflo 2003). 
In this paper, we test the hypothesis that persistent differences in returns across farmers play a key role 
in determining sustained adoption of new technologies.  We do so using a unique dataset to study a 
non profit initiative, the Cocoa Abrabopa Association, which alleviated credit constraints to the adoption 
of the hi tech package of inputs (a specific combination of fertilizer, insecticide, and fungicide) among 
cocoa farmers in Ghana.   
The role of treatment effect heterogeneity in explaining low adoption rates in African agriculture is 
understudied in the literature, with papers by Tavneet Suri (Suri 2007) and Duflo, Kremer and Robinson 
(Duflo et al. 2008) providing two notable exceptions.  Using an observational, panel dataset of Kenyan 
maize  farmers,  Suri  estimates  a  model  that  allows  for  heterogeneous  returns  to  fertilizer.    Suri’s 
econometric method allows her to estimate a mean return to fertilizer use for four subgroups, which are 
defined by their adoption and disadoption histories in each of the four waves of her data.  There is a 
non monotonic relationship between the adoption rates and expected returns of these subgroups in her 
data.  Suri makes sense of this by arguing that transaction costs are particularly high where returns are 
highest.   
Rather than estimate mean returns for observable subgroups, we characterize the full distribution of 
returns for those who adopt.  We do so in two ways: by estimating quantile treatment effects, and by 
constructing a proxy for experienced returns at the individual level.  Quantile treatment effects and our 
panel based proxy for individual returns provide a means of getting at this individual distribution under 
alternative, and non overlapping, assumptions.  We argue that a full characterization of the distribution 
of individual returns is important for understanding the relationship between returns adoption rates. 
High expected returns, even within an observable subgroup, may be driven by a few individuals with 
very high returns, and so may be consistent with negative returns to adoption for a majority of members 
in that subgroup.  To understand the relationship between returns and adoption, we are interested in 
the fraction of farmers with positive (net) returns.  Methods that return an average treatment effect – 
even within subgroups – do not yield this information.   
Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2008) also estimate quantile treatment effects.  They find that net returns 
to fertilizer adoption are negative for 13.5 percent of farmers, in spite of the estimated 36 percent 
seasonal return.
1  Because their design is based on randomized allocation of fertilizer across the plots of 
a  given  farmer,  Duflo  et  al.  can  estimate  farmer specific  returns.    Such  an  experimental  approach 
provides an ideal source of variation in fertilizer use with which to identify internally valid estimates of 
the average returns to its adoption.  However, randomized allocation of fertilizer does not by itself 
provide exogenous variation in the returns to fertilizer experienced by individual farmers.  The key 
                                                            
1 As pointed out by Andrew Foster and Rosenzweig, these “net” returns do not account for labor costs (Foster & 
Rosenzweig 2010).  If labor or other complementary inputs also increased in response to fertilizer use, then they 
will  overestimate  the  true net  returns,  and  underestimate  the  fraction  of  farmers  for  whom net  returns  are 
negative.   4 
 
contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  demonstrate  a  relationship  between  the  returns  experienced  by 
individual farmers and their subsequent decisions to sustain use of the technology.   
We take as our starting point that the literature is far from conclusive on three questions:  (1) How 
heterogeneous  are  the  rates  of  return  to  agricultural  technologies,  such  as  fertilizer?    (2)  Does 
heterogeneity in returns affect the sustained adoption of such technologies, beyond farmers’ initial 
experimentation?  And (3) is this heterogeneity in realized returns caused by transient shocks, or does it 
reflect persistent differences in the suitability of a technology across farms and farmers?  In the case of 
Ghanaian cocoa, we answer each of these in the affirmative:  heterogeneity in the returns to fertilizer 
use is substantial, it affects continued adoption, and it reflects persistent differences across farmers.   
We proceed as follows.  Section 2 describes the intervention, the data and the quasi experimental 
setting that will be used to estimate impacts.  Section 3 presents our estimates of the average treatment 
effect,  demonstrating  robustness  to  a  range  of  identifying  assumptions.    Having  established  large 
positive returns on average, we turn in Section 4 to demonstrating the heterogeneity of these treatment 
effects.  In Section 5, we test for a relationship between experienced treatment effects and program 
retention.  Section 6 concludes. 
2 Context, data and quasi experimental design 
In 2006, the Cocoa Abrabopa Association (CAA), a not for profit subsidiary of Wienco Ghana Ltd, began 
a program of distributing inputs on seasonal credit to cocoa farmers in Ghana.  With the support of the 
Ghana Cocoa Board, CAA provided farmers with access to two acres’ worth of a package of fertilizer, 
pesticides, and fungicides.  This specific bundle of inputs, known as the hi tech package, had been 
promoted by the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana since 2001, though problems of poor repayment 
rates had limited distribution.
2  CAA provided these inputs to groups of between 8 and 15 farmers on a 
joint liability basis, with dynamic incentives:  groups that failed to repay in full would be suspended for a 
minimum of one year, while those that repaid successfully would be given four acres’ worth of inputs in 
the following year, subject to approval of a CAA field officer.  In addition to these physical inputs, 
farmers in the first year of membership were advised on their proper application by a CAA promoter, 
and  some  business  training  would  be  provided  by  Technoserve  Ghana.    Judged  by  its  expanding 
membership rolls, the program has been wildly successful:  from 1,440 farmers in 2006, CAA expanded 
to a membership of 18,000 farmers by 2009 (Cocoa Abrabopa Association 2009).   
To identify the impact of CAA membership on farmer incomes, we took advantage of the fact that much 
of CAA’s expansion during this time was at an extensive margin:  it involved expansion into new villages.  
CAA’s expansion operates on an annual cycle, as follows.  Promoters first arrive in a new village in 
January of a given year, and by February farmers make their decisions to opt into the program (or not), 
                                                            
2 Although the use of these broad categories of inputs is not new to Ghanaian cocoa farmers, the particular 
configuration was.  Evidence from other contexts (Duflo et al. 2008) shows that economic returns can be highly 
sensitive to precise quantities and combinations of inputs used.   5 
 
forming groups accordingly.  Inputs begin to arrive in May, but the harvest does not take place until 
October, with repayment of inputs due by December of that year. 
We visited farmers in September of 2008 and 2009 to observe the outcomes for the 2007/08 and 
2008/09 seasons, respectively.  In each wave of the survey, we conducted a representative sample of 
two types of villages:  those that had been reached by CAA for the first time in the prior year, and those 
that had been reached by CAA for the first time in the current year, i.e., the growing season that was 
ongoing at the time of our visit.
3  The former had experienced one full season since the arrival of 
Abrabopa  and  had  made  their  membership  decisions  for  the  following  season,  but  had  not  yet 
harvested any cocoa in the second year of exposure by the time of our visit.  The latter had made 
membership decisions for the season in progress at the time of our survey, but had not yet experienced 
the results of those decisions.  
In each type of village, we conducted representative samples of two populations of farmers:  those who 
joined in the first year of its availability in their village, whom we call early adopters, and those who 
opted not to join CAA in the same year, whom we call early non adopters.  The resulting sample used in 
estimation is given in Table 1.   
Table 1.  Estimating sample, by survey round and membership classification 
Year village first visited 
by Abrabopa 
Farmer’s adoption decision in year of 
first visit 
Number of observations, 
by survey round 
2007/08 season 2008/09 season 
2007  Adopt  82  0 
Do not adopt  41  0 
2008  Adopt  88  72 
Do not adopt 42 29 
2009  Adopt  0 95 
Do not adopt 0 37 
Note:  survey round refers to the most recent completed harvest as of the time of each survey.  2007 denotes 
the 2007/08 cocoa season; 2008 denotes the 2008/09 cocoa season.   
As will be described in detail in the next section, we use a cross sectional difference in differences 
approach to estimate the average effect of the first wave of Abrabopa membership on early adopters.  
To do so, we pool data from both survey rounds. We then define two key variable.  First, we define a 
dummy variable,  , to indicate exposure to Abrabopa in village  and year .  Given the sampling 
strategy in Table 1, any village in our sample with    must have 	
  .  Second, we define 
 
as an indicator of the adoption decision of farmer  in village  and year .  To denote early adopters, 
who adopt in the first year of exposure, we drop the time subscript and define 
   
   	  
	    for some  and for all  .  Early adopters choose to adopt in the first year of availability in 
their village, but not necessarily in subsequent years, as we shall see.  In the sample used to estimate 
impacts  on  farmer  production  –  which  restricts  attention  to  the  year  of  exposure  or  the  year 
                                                            
3 In the 2009 survey, we also revisited farmers from the previous survey who had by then been exposed to the 
program for two seasons.  To focus on a comparable set of “early adopters”, and in light of the possible cumulative 
effects of sustained fertilizer use, we do not make use  of these observations in this paper.  See Opoku and 
coauthors (Opoku et al. 2009) for further details of the survey.   6 
 
immediately prior – treatment  occurs if both the individual is an early adopter and Abrabopa is 
present in the village:   
 .  
 
Figure 1.  Average cocoa output, by treatment status in year of survey 
 
The basis for our difference in differences identification strategy is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows 
our four categories of farmers. The first    	
     are those who receive treatment (i.e., they 
have adopted the hi tech package).  The second (  	
     were offered the treatment but did 
not adopt.  The third   	
     are farmers who will adopt in the first year that Abrabopa 
reaches their village, but whose villages have not completed a season under treatment at the time of 
the survey round under consideration.  And fourth are those farmers who will choose not to join in the 
first year of exposure, and whose villages have not yet been exposed to Abrabopa   	
    .  
Given this setup, we can read off a difference in differences estimate of program impacts directly from 
Figure 1.  We estimate the average treatment effect on the treated as  
  
  	      
  	     
   !
  	       
  	    "#  $%#&
The part of (2.1) gives the differences in output between those who were early adopters and those who 
were not, in villages exposed to Abrabopa. This within village difference nets out one potential form of 
selection bias, arising from any common, village level productivity variables that may be correlated with 
the timing of Abrabopa exposure.  Still, this may be a biased estimate of the treatment effect if relatively 
productive farmers were more likely to become members.  By subtracting the second part of (2.1), the 
pre treatment  difference  between  early  adopters  and  non adopters  in  villages  not  yet  exposed  to 
Abrabopa, we can account for this second form of selection bias, arising from within village selection. 7 
 
In the pooled cross section without any controls, the average treatment effect of Abrabopa adoption  in 
equation (2.1) can be read off from Figure 1 as 546.75 kg.
4  From the figure, neither form of selection 
bias appears very strong:  in villages not yet experiencing output under treatment, those who go on to 
become early adopters are, if anything, worse off than no adopters.  Moreover, non adopters in villages 
under treatment are, if anything, worse off than non adopters in villages not yet treated. 
Sampled farmers also provided information on a range of socio economic characteristics and agricultural 
practices.  These data are summarized in Appendix Table A1, where we present summary statistics by 
survey round and treatment status.  Table A1 includes the prima facie evidence of Abrabopa’s impacts 
that underlie Figure 1:  early adopters’ output exceeds that of non adopters in exposed villages in both 
survey  waves,  while  early  adopters’  output  levels  in  the  season  before  their  village  is  exposed  to 
Abrabopa are higher than non adopters in 2008 (1615 vs 1460 kg) but lower in 2009 (1034 vs 1376 kg).  
Rates of fertilizer use are low (less than 50 percent) among farmers not yet reached by Abrabopa.  
Farms in this sector are typically small:  farmers have an average of approximately four hectares of land 
devoted to cocoa trees.   Education levels are low, just under 40 percent of farmers having completed 
education beyond primary level, and just over 20 percent of farmers in the sample are female.  Given 
the quasi experimental setting, we defer a discussion of covariate balance across treatment and control 
groups to the following section, where we present a more detailed explanation of our identification 
strategy. 
3 Average returns 
To make clear the identifying assumptions underlying our estimates of average returns, consider the 
following model for potential outcomes of gross output under two counterfactual scenarios – with and 
without the hi tech inputs (  	respectively):  
' ( ' )*  )+  ), ' (3.1)
 (  )*  )+  ),  (3.2)
for farmer  in village  and year .  For the time being, we ignore the role of observed, farmer specific 
covariates.  The * give farmer specific, time invariant unobserved characteristics, while the + capture 
village year unobserved shocks to productivity; we will be concerned about the potential correlation of 
both with treatment status.
5  Without further loss of generality, we assume that the !*" !+" 
!,-"  , for  	  , so that the difference . (   ( ' gives the average treatment effect in 
this population.  The quantity  (   ( ' )! ,   , '  "  gives the average treatment 
effect on the treated.     
                                                            
4 This differs from the estimate in column (2) of Table 2 only because the estimates in that table include a control 
for the year of survey. 
5  For  counterfactual  states,   	  ,  we  can  decompose  the  state specific  error  term,  ,-,  into  two  parts, 
/- )0 -,  where  the  first  of  these  represents  a  time invariant,  individual specific  return  (“essential 
heterogeneity”), which is potentially knowable by the farmer.  The second component, 0-, is time varying and 
captures a source of risk.  Both can impact future technology decisions:  the former affects subjective perceived 
returns, while the latter affects farmers’ liquidity, buffer stocks, etc.   8 
 
Observed outcomes are therefore given by the switching regression,   ' )   '.  
Substituting in equations (3.1) and (3.2) yields 
  (  ( ' ),   , ' )( ' )*  )+  ), '#  (3.3) 
Examination of equation (3.3) clarifies the nature of the selection problem that must be addressed in 
estimating  the  ATT.    A  regression  of   o n    returns  a  consistent  estimate  of    only  if 
!* )+ ),'"  !* )+ ),'"  #     Thus  consistent  estimates  of    are  possible 
even if individual specific returns to adoption ,  , ' are correlated with adoption choices, .  
But the assumption required for identification of the ATT from a regression of output on treatment 
alone will fail if adoption is correlated either with village level differences in productivity or with the 
idiosyncratic productivity of farmers. 
To see how we address these sources of selection bias in practice, we first formalize the process by 
which membership is determined.  Recall that we define treatment, , as the effect of the first year 
of use of the hi tech package, in light of the potential for accumulation of impacts over years.  In our 
data, we restrict attention to village years, , in which either (a) Abrabopa has never had any members 
in that village before, and Abrabopa will have its first members in village  in year ) ; or (b) Abrabopa 
has its first ever members in village  in year .  Consequently we examine first year impacts only on the 
subpopulation of individuals who join Abrabopa in the first year that it is available in their village. 
For  this subpopulation,  use  of  Abrabopa’s  hi tech  inputs  is  the  product  of  two  factors:  firstly, that 
Abrabopa visits the individual’s village, , in year , and secondly, that the individual joins in that year.  
Let  be a dummy variable indicating the presence of Abrabopa in village  in year , and let 
 be a 
dummy variable indicating that individual  in village  is the “type” who joins Abrabopa in the first year 
in which it is available in their village.  Thus   
# 
Our identification strategy rests on two key features of our data.  The first of these is the ability to 
observe the future membership decisions of individuals in villages that have not yet been visited by 
Abrabopa at the time of the output realization .
6  The second of these is the ability to observe the 
productive  outcomes  for  a  representative sample  of  those  who  do  not  join  Abrabopa  in  any  given 
village year.   
We  use  the  first  of  these  features  to  address  potential  correlation  between  the  individual specific 
unobservables and treatment status, arising through individual selection into Abrabopa.  The second 
allows us to address the potential correlation between village level characteristics and treatment status, 
arising through the non random roll out of Abrabopa coverage.   
To do so, we assume that the process by which farmers are selected into membership is constant over 
time, with respect to unobserved characteristics that differentiate them from village mean productivity: 
!* ), '
  	   "  ! *  ), '
  "  
 
(A1)
                                                            
6 For a similar use of future adoption decisions to address selection problems in a pipeline evaluation, see, e.g., 
Erica Field (Field 2005).   9 
 
If those who join Abrabopa when it first reaches their villages in year  are the best farmers in those 
villages, then farmers who join Abrabopa upon its arrival in their villages in year )  are also the best 
farmers in those villages.   
If we were also willing to assume that the roll out of Abrabopa availability was as good as random with 
regard to village productivity levels (!+"    , then a comparison of current and future program 
members would suffice to identify the ATT.  We operationalize this as a first, heuristic identification 
strategy by restricting attention to current and future members, and regressing output on treatment 
status.   
Effective randomness of roll out is a strong assumption, however.  We are able to relax this by making 
use of data on non members in program villages.  In essence, we can use mean outcomes of those who 
do not join Abrabopa in current and future program villages to estimate the village specific effect.  Our 
estimates under this identification strategy are then a form of difference in difference estimates:   we 
compare within village differences between those who join Abrabopa and those who do not, in villages 
that have just been reached by Abrabopa in year  and those that will only be reached by Abrabopa in 
year ) .   
This strategy requires an auxiliary assumption that there are no externalities from the presence of the 
program on non members – akin to the standard stable unit treatment value assumption.  Formally, we 
require that 
!* ), '
  	   "  !* ), '
  	   "# ( A 2 )  
Since we are interested here only in impacts in the first year of the program’s presence in a village, we 
believe this to be a plausible assumption.  Neighboring farmers will not have had an opportunity to 
observe program impacts and make any corresponding adjustments in their own production.
7 
Given assumptions (A1) and (A2), we operationalize our difference in differences estimator in two ways.  
Most directly, we regress output on dummy variables for adoption in the first year of exposure, 
, 
current exposure to Abrabopa, , and  their interaction,  
 , which is synonymous with 
treatment in our estimating sample.  Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), a regression of the form 





consistently estimates the ATT as the coefficient 1-.  An alternative is to use a fixed effects estimator for 
equation (3.4), in which case the village level exposure variable, , is not identified, but the treatment 
effect  for  early  adopters  remains  identified  by  the  interaction  of  indicators  for  the  early  adoption 
decision of the individual and village level exposure.  The latter may improve precision in a context 
where there is substantial heterogeneity in production across villages even within the set of exposed or 
unexposed villages.     
                                                            
7 Conley and Udry demonstrate that farmers do adapt their technology choices in response to ‘news’ about their 
neighbors’ levels of production (Conley & Udry 2010).  As in their estimation strategy, we rely on farmers’ inability 
to react until after output realizations have occurred. 10 
 
Table 2.  Estimates of average impact of CAA membership on members in the first year 









VARIABLES  OLS  DD  FE  FE 
              
treated:  early adopter * current Abrabopa village,  
 5   395.9*  547.6**  661.7***  527.4*** 
(217.3)  (226.3)  (204.4)  (155.8) 
early adopter, 
   89.7   222.8   57.9 
(232.3)  (160.4)  (145.5) 
current Abrabopa village,    147.6 
(293.2) 
constant  1533***  1582***  1405***  319.9 
(320.5)  (235.0)  (79.16)  (732.2) 
Observations  337  486  486  359 
R squared  0.031  0.025  0.012  0.341 
Number of village years        32  29 
Dependent variable is cocoa output, in kg.  Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at village level.  Estimates 
in columns (1) and (2) contain dummy for survey round (not shown).  Columns (3) and (4) include village year fixed 
effects.  Estimates in column (4) contain quadratic functions of farm size and farmer age, controls for household size, 
farmer education (JSS or greater), and farmer gender.  Sample in column (1) is current and future members only; 
subsequent columns include those who do not join at any point.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Results of these estimates are presented in Table 2.  In column (1), we estimate program impacts simply 
by regressing output levels on a dummy for current membership, while restricting the sample to current 
and future members of Abrabopa.  As discussed above, this provides a valid estimate of the treatment 
effect  only under  the strong assumption  that  the roll out  is  uncorrelated with unobserved  location 
characteristics.  The assumption of random roll out yields an estimated average treatment effect on the 
treated of 359.9 kg.   
In column (2) we relax this assumption by using data on both those who join Abrabopa when it first 
reaches their village and those who choose not to join in this initial year.  This is the (cross sectional) 
difference in differences estimator described by equation (3.3) above, and returns consistent estimates 
of the treatment effect under assumptions (A1) and (A2).  Non members in villages first visited by 
Abrabopa in year )  represent the omitted category.  Several features are notable.  We estimate an 
ATT of 547.6 kilograms, and this estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero at the 5 percent 
confidence level.  We find only limited evidence for the two forms of selection bias considered.  Non 
adopters in villages already reached by Abrabopa, who have   , have output levels 147.6 kilograms 
less than non adopters in villages not yet reached by Abrabopa; this is our estimate of !+  " .  
While this estimate is relatively imprecise, it does not provide support for the view that Abrabopa was 
systematically rolled out to more productive villages early on, or that non adopters in exposed villages 
have benefited indirectly from the participation of their peers.  Moreover, those who go on to be early 
adopters are, if anything, worse off than those who do not adopt at the first opportunity, in villages prior 
to exposure.  Our estimate of !*
  "  is  89.7 based on the identification strategy in column (2).   11 
 
Estimates  from  the  fixed  effects  specification  are  presented  in  column  (3),  where  fixed  effects  are 
included for each village year in our data to allow for the fact that some villages are observed both 
before and after exposure.  This specification returns a similar estimate of the ATT, 661.7 kg, which is 
now  significant  at  the  1  percent  level.    To  put  the  magnitude  of  this  effect  in  perspective,  future 
members  of  Abrabopa  have  an  average  output  of  1,464  kg:  the  estimated  effect  is  equal  to  an 
approximately 45 percent increase in total production.  With mean yields of 237 kg/acre among future 
joiners of the program, under the assumption that all impacts are concentrated on the 2 acres to which 
the inputs are supposed to be applied, this would represent an increase in yields on this land of nearly 
140 percent.   
In column (4) of Table 2, we augment our village year fixed effects specification by including a vector of 
controls for observable farmer characteristics.  We do not control for productive inputs, on the grounds 
that  changes  in  labor  and  non labor  inputs  mediate  the  causal  effect  of  program  membership  on 
production (Foster & Rosenzweig 2010).  More generally, controlling for post treatment variables may 
introduce biases into estimates of causal effects (Heckman & Navarro Lozano 2004, Pearl 2009).  We 
include controls for farmer gender, an indicator variable for whether the farmer has attained junior 
secondary or higher education, and household size, as well as (quadratic functions of) farmer age and 
cultivated farm size.  Given that it typically takes three years for cocoa trees to reach bearing age, we 
consider it reasonable to take our measure of cultivated farm size, which explicitly excludes trees too 
young to bear cocoa, as exogenous in this context.  The resulting estimated treatment effect is reduced 
to 527.4 kg, but is still statistically significant in its difference from zero at the one percent confidence 
level.  The similarity of these results to those from the village fixed effects specification suggest that 
unconfoundedness, conditional only on the village fixed effect and the first year membership decision, is 
not an unreasonable assumption in this context.  Relative to a mean output level of 1313 kg among 
eventual  Abrabopa  members  in  the  year  prior  to  exposure,  this  represents  an  increase  in  gross 
production of approximately 40 percent.   
We can use a similar identification strategy to test whether participation in Abrabopa increases use of 
complementary inputs.  If such impacts were to be found, then these should be taken into account in 
calculating returns to participation and technology use.  For any input, 6, used by farmer  in village  
and year , the effect of Abrabopa membership on input use can be implemented, as in column (3) of 
Table 2 and analogous assumptions to (A1) and (A2), by regressing 6 on early adoption, 
, and its 
interaction with current exposure,  
 , in a specification with village year fixed effects.  We 
do so in particular for three types of labor input:  household labor, hired labor, and nnoboa labor, a 
traditional labor sharing arrangement.  These results are reported in columns (1) to (3) of Table 3.  In 
each case, point estimates are economically small, and we are not able to reject the hypothesis that 
these complementary input levels remain constant under participation in the program.  In the absence 
of any such indirect costs, an impact of 527.4 kg corresponds to an economic return of 129 percent on 
the value of the inputs received. 12 
 
Table 3.  Intermediate inputs and covariate balance 



















                          
early adopter * current 
Abrabopa village,  
 5   3.029  15.64  0.561   0.365  1.594   0.0707  0.178  0.0213 
(17.93)  (11.64)  (1.198)  (0.742)  (2.163)  (0.0728)  (0.262)  (0.0785) 
early adopter, 
   15.23   0.420  1.197***   0.805  2.418   0.0330  0.0207  0.0594 
(11.26)  (7.481)  (0.425)  (0.535)  (2.469)  (0.0683)  (0.232)  (0.0941) 
Constant  84.19***  26.36***  1.711***  4.657***  46.31***  0.269***  3.145***  0.525*** 
(7.555)  (3.788)  (0.402)  (0.385)  (1.596)  (0.0453)  (0.148)  (0.0534) 
Observations  482  482  482  510  368  368  368  368 
R squared  0.005  0.009  0.010  0.012  0.014  0.008  0.001  0.005 
Number of village years  32  32  32  32  29  29  29  29 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at village level.  All specifications include village year fixed effects.  Farm size 
defined as area under cocoa cultivation.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, the same approach can be used to estimate pseudo treatment effects on variables that should 
not respond to treatment (in the short term), such as farmer gender, age, and education, as well as 
cocoa farm size.
8  This is analogous to the standard practice of checking for ‘successful’ randomization in 
prospective experimental designs.  Rejection of the null hypothesis of no pseudo effect on any of these 
variables would suggest, minimally, the importance of controlling for them in estimating causal effects, 
as in column (4) of Table 2.  Such a rejection might also give cause for concern about the assumptions 
underlying the identification strategy more generally (Heckman & Hotz 1989).  However, as reported in 
columns (4) – (8) of Table 3, we are able to accept the null hypothesis of zero pseudo effects on each of 
these predetermined  variables. 
4 Quantile treatment effects 
Estimated returns to the CAA technological package are high among adopters, and yet 32 percent of 
first year members in the sample were no longer members one year later.  This appears to be a special 
case of the broader puzzle in agricultural technology adoption:  if returns to adoption of this technology 
are indeed so high, and if credit constraints are not binding in this case, then why do so many members 
drop out?   
Persistent heterogeneity in returns across individuals provides one explanation.  If expected returns vary 
substantially across individuals – and if individuals are able to learn about their idiosyncratic returns – 
then low adoption could be an outcome of rational choices.  The average treatment effect on the 
treated estimated above is not informative about the fraction of farmers expecting positive returns – 
                                                            
8 Cocoa trees generally require a minimum of three years to reach bearing age.   13 
 
what Heckman calls the “voting criterion” (Heckman 2010).  In this section, we examine the extent to 
which  high  average  treatment  effects  mask  substantial  heterogeneity  in  the  ex post  distribution  of 
impacts.   
To do so, we conduct two exercises.  First, following Heckman and co authors (Heckman et al. 1997), we 
estimate  the  Hoeffding  and  Frêchet  bounds  on  the  amount  of  heterogeneity  consistent  with  the 
marginal distributions observed in the data (Frêchet 1951, Hoeffding 1940).  This allows us to obtain a 
lower bound on the variance of the treatment effect from the marginal distributions with and without 
treatment.  The estimated lower bound on the amount of treatment effect heterogeneity is substantial 
in  economic  terms,  though  we  are  unable  to  reject  a  constant  effects  model  given  small  sample 
limitations.  These bounds exhaust the available information in the absence of further assumptions.  
Second, we consider the implications of assuming perfect positive dependence (PPD) in the outcome 
distributions for the quantiles of the impact distribution.  Under this assumption, we show that in spite 
of  the  high  average  gross  impacts,  returns  net  of  input  costs  are  not  significantly  positive  for  a 
substantial proportion of those who join Abrabopa.   
We begin by estimating Hoeffding and Frêchet bounds to test whether the estimated impacts in our 
data are consistent with a constant effects model.  Since Heckman and co authors argued on behalf of 
doing  so  (Heckman  et al.  1997),  a  handful  of  studies  have  applied  this  approach  to  estimate  the 
distribution  of  treatment  effects.    In  a  developed country  context,  Bitler  and  co authors  study  the 
distribution of the effects of welfare reform on the unemployed (Bitler et al. 2006).  Two recent articles 
have applied this approach in development economics, both studying the distribution of the effect of 
conditional cash transfers:  Djebbari and Smith, on PROGRESA, and Dammert, on the Red de Protección 
Social in Nicaragua (Dammert 2009, Djebbari & Smith 2008).   
We adapt the procedure outlined by Abbring and Heckman (Abbring & Heckman 2007) and as applied by 
Djebbari and Smith (Djebbari & Smith 2008) as follows.  First, we obtain an estimate of the minimum 
amount of heterogeneity in impacts that is consistent with our data.  We construct this measure as the 
standard deviation of the quantile treatment effects,
9 which is equal to 454 kg in our sample.  Second, to 
test whether the observed impact standard deviation is consistent with a constant effects model, we 
simulate the distribution of this statistic under the constant effects assumption.  This is done, as in 
Djebbari and Smith, by keeping only control villages.  For each simulation, we randomly assign half of 
the control villages to our synthetic treatment group; we use the estimated treatment effect from Table 
2, column (2) to simulate treatment for the eventual Abrabopa members in those villages; and we 
repeat our cross sectional, difference in differences estimation procedure to obtain an impact standard 
deviation on this synthetic sample.   
                                                            
9 As Heckmen and co authors argue (Abbring & Heckman 2007, Heckman et al. 1997), this is equal to the standard 
deviation of the treatment effects, 7 89 	  9 '	, under the assumption of perfect positive dependence, 
discussed below.  PPD is the assumption about the joint distribution of 9 	9 ' that minimizes the impact standard 
deviation.   We base this procedure on estimates of the treatment effect at each decile, and do not use a finer 
division of the outcome distribution because of our small sample size.   14 
 
Figure 2.  Simulated distribution of estimated impact standard deviation under the constant effects model 
 
Notes:  Figure illustrates kernel density estimates of the simulated distribution of estimated standard impact 
standard deviation.  Simulation is conducted under the null of a constant effects model, with average treatment 
effect as reported in Table 2.  Results are for 400 repetitions, with 10 quantiles of the treatment distribution 
estimated in each repetition.  Dotted line shows the value of the impact standard deviation in the actual data. 
The results are illustrated in Figure 2.  The median impact standard deviation across 400 simulations of 
the constant effects model is 337 kg, substantially smaller than that found in our data.  However, in 24 
percent  of  our  simulated  treatment  effects,  the  constant  effects  model  yields  an  impact  standard 
deviation greater 454 kg, the value estimated from our actual data.  Because our small sample does not 
estimate quantile treatment effects very precisely, we are unable to reject the constant effects model at 
conventional significance levels.
10    
Although  we  are  unable  to  statistically  reject  the  constant effects  model,  we  can  use  a  quantile 
treatment effects approach to show that the heterogeneity in returns we do observe has economic 
implications.  Differences in quantiles of the distribution of outcomes under treatment and control can 
be  interpreted  as  quantiles  of  the  treatment  effect  only  under  the  assumption  of  perfect  positive 
dependence.  In this case, the treatment does not change the ranking of outcomes, so that the first 
quantile of the distribution without treatment, 9 ', represents the counterfactual for individuals in the 
first quantile of the distribution with treatment, 9 .  With treatment and control groups of different 
sizes, we compare impacts across quantiles of the outcome distribution, rather than directly matching 
individuals. 
To do so, we continue with the identification strategy of Section 3.  In particular, we estimate quantile 
treatment effects using a model that includes a dummy variable for presence of Abrabopa in the village 
                                                            
10 To improve the power of this test, we have also simulated constant effect treatment effects for the whole 
sample, including both the treated and the untreated, by subtracting the ATE from the realized output of the 
treated and then re assigning all villages to treatment or control status and simulating treatment for members 
accordingly.    The  resulting  increase  in  the  sample  size  employed  in  each  simulation  reduces  the  fraction  of 
simulated repetitions with an impact standard deviation greater than 454 kg to 0.138, and reduces the median 
estimated impact standard deviation to 266 kg. 15 
 
in the year under study, , as well as a dummy identifying those individuals who join Abrabopa in the 
first year of exposure in their village, 
.  Treatment is denoted by the interaction of early adopters 
with village level exposure:   
 .  We now explicitly adopt a random coefficients framework 
to estimate the regression model, 





In the potential outcomes framework of equations (3.1) and (3.2), 1- (   ( ' ),   , '.  Under 
assumptions  (A1),  (A2),  and  (PPD),  quantile  treatment  effects  on  the  treated  are  identified  by  the 
coefficient, 1-, on this interaction term at the corresponding quantiles of the outcome distribution.
11   
Results  are  presented  in  Figure  3.    Given  that  we  only  observe  170  individuals  after  one  year  of 
treatment, the figure presents estimates for vigintiles (20 quantiles) of the outcome distribution among 
the treated.  For ease of interpretation, we include a horizontal line at an impact of 230.8 kg, the sales 
volume required to repay the Abrabopa loan in the years studied.  In the absence of any other costs of 
complementary inputs, individuals make a profit if and only if they experience a treatment effect in 
excess of this point.   
 
Figure 3.  Quantile treatment effects 
 
Notes:    Figure  illustrates  estimated  quantile  treatment  effects  and  associated  bootstrap  (90%)  confidence 
intervals.   Non parametric, block bootstrap confidence interval based on 400 repetitions, re sampling at village 
level.  Horizontal line at 230.8 kg indicates cocoa output required to repay direct cost of inputs. 
Confidence intervals are estimated by a block bootstrap, with resampling conducted at the village year 
level to account for potential non independence in outcomes within these sampling units.  Although we 
                                                            
11 For quantile :, this is the treatment effect on treated individual  such that ; < => ? @  ABC D   E: . 16 
 
can reject the null hypothesis of a treatment effect of zero for all but tails of the distribution, we fail to 
reject the hypothesis of a treatment effect above the break even point for individuals at or below the 
25
th percentile and above the 80
th percentile.  (It should be noted that estimates at the upper end of the 
distribution are relatively imprecise, due to a small number of high output farmers in our sample.)    
Figure  3  suggests  that,  in  this  context,  an  exclusive  emphasis  on  mean  impacts  misses  important 
features of the distribution.  In economic terms, there appears to be substantial heterogeneity in returns 
to program participation; in general, returns appear to be higher for more productive farmers.  Crucially, 
we fail to reject the hypothesis of zero returns, net of repayment costs, for 7 of the 20 vigintiles of the 
treated population. 
Both time varying and time invariant heterogeneity in returns may matter for the sustained use of a 
new technology.  Even shocks that farmers know to be transient can affect future technology use, if they 
impact on farmers’ willingness to take on risk (Dercon & Christiaensen 2007).  On the other hand, time 
invariant  heterogeneity  may  affect  farmers’  willingness  to  continue  through  a  process  of 
experimentation – so long as farmers are uncertain about these returns prior to membership.
12  We 
address  the  questions  of  whether  observed  heterogeneity  in  returns  can  help  to  explain  program 
retention, and through what mechanism, in the following section.   
5 Treatment effect heterogeneity and program retention 
Treatment  effects  at  each  quantile  of  the  outcome  distribution  are  correlated  with  the  program 
retention  rate.    We  show  this  in  three  steps.    First,  we  show  that  quantile  treatment  effects  are 
correlated with program retention among individuals within a radius of that quantile.  To take this 
further, we would ideally have a measure of individual specific treatment effects, for the treated in our 
sample.    We  propose  the  two period  change  in  output  among  treated  farmers  as  a  proxy  for  the 
individual treatment effect.  In our second step, we validate this measure of individual specific impacts 
by showing that quantile treatment effects correlate with the two period changes in output among 
individuals within a neighborhood of that quantile.  Third, we employ this measure of individual specific 
returns to show that this is correlated with retention rates, even after conditioning on a vector of own 
and  group  characteristics.    This  suggests  that  heterogeneity  in  ex  post  returns  is  relevant  for  the 
subsequent membership decisions of farmers, and that this relationship contains information beyond 
that in subgroups defined by observable characteristics.   
To assess whether quantile treatment effects correlate with retention rates at that quantile, we must 
construct an estimate of the relevant retention rate.  To do so, we take advantage of information from 
surrounding  observations  as  follows:    sort  treated  individuals  by  their  outcomes.    Suppose  we  are 
estimating treatment effects for F quantiles:  this will result in estimates for the GF  percentile, the 
                                                            
12 In a variety of contexts, economic returns are highly sensitive to the precise quantities and combinations of 
inputs used.  For example, Duflo and co authors find that the right combination of fertilizer is highly profitable, but 
find that the Kenya Ministry of Agriculture’s recommended dosage – in spite of having the highest agronomic 
return – actually results in farmers making a loss on average (Duflo et al. 2008) 17 
 
% 5 GF percentile, and so on.  For quantiles :	##	F, we obtain an estimate of the retention rate 
at the corresponding 
''H








KIL.   
Figure 4.  Quantile treatment effects and program retention rates 
 
Notes:  Figure plots mean retention rates in the surrounding quantile against the treatment effect at that 
quantile of the outcome distribution.  20 quantiles are employed in estimation, leading to estimates of the QTE 
ate 19 interior points.   
Figure 4 plots the relationship between quantile treatment effects and retention rates for 20 quantiles.  
As  expected,  there  appears  to  be  a  positive  relationship  between  the  two.    The  rank  correlation 
(Spearman’s rho) between the QTE and the retention rate, across quantiles of the distribution, is 0.38.  
We employ a block bootstrap to obtain a sampling distribution for Spearman’s rho that can be used to 
test the null hypothesis of independence between the two statistics.  This allows us to account for 
potential  non independence  of  observations  within  villages.    Given  the  relatively  small  number  of 
clusters and the fact that the use of 20 quantiles throws away some of the variation in the data, we are 
unable to reject this null hypothesis: we obtain a p value of 0.18 with 400 bootstrap repetitions.  
To provide a more powerful test of the relationship between the magnitude of the treatment effect 
experienced and the retention decision, we construct a proxy for treatment effects at the individual 
level,  and  show  that  this  individual  measure  correlates  with  retention,  even  after  conditioning  on 
possible confounding factors.  Of course, since each farmer can make one and only one membership 
decision in a given period, the treatment effect that she experiences is never directly observable.  This is 
the core of the “fundamental problem of causal inference” (Holland 1986).   
Under certain (necessarily untestable) assumptions, individual measures of the actual treatment effect 
can be constructed.  Our aim here is more limited:  we seek to construct a proxy for the realized 18 
 
treatment effect, and to argue that variation in this proxy across individuals is correlated with variation 
in the true treatment effect.  The purpose of this is to test the hypothesis that the decision to renew 
membership is affected by the realization of current output.  We will test this using a binary choice 
model of the form 
	





where membership in period )  is chosen if 
5 P ,  is individual ’s realized return in period , 
and 6 represents a vector of controls for potential confounding factors, to be described below.  Under 
the assumption of normality of the error term 0	
, the parameters of (5.1) can be estimated as a 
probit. 
Because the individual’s idiosyncratic return, , is not directly observable, we must estimate equation 
(5.1) with a proxy measure of the idiosyncratic return.  For each individual in the treated group, we use 
two period  changes  in  cocoa  output,   Q    	RK,  as  the  basis  for  such  a  proxy  for  the 
experienced treatment effect.
13  Following the notation of equations (3.1) and (3.2), this will correspond 
to the true treatment effect, , only if + + 	RK and ,' , '	RK.  This would require both that 
any village level components of production are constant over time, and that individuals’ idiosyncratic 
output in the absence of Abrabopa is the same in the pre exposure period  %  as it is in the first period 
of exposure, # 
Neither of these assumptions will hold in practice:  there will be village level characteristics (such as 
rainfall)  that  vary  across  years,  as  well  as  shocks  to  potential  output  in  the  absence  of  fertilizer.  
Consequently the proxy  Q will be composed of the true treatment effect for individual  in period , 
     ', plus two terms that reflect the failure of these assumptions:   
 Q   )S+  + 	RKT UVVVWVVVX
Y Z[\





The correlation between this proxy and future membership decisions, 	
, will reflect the effect of 
realized returns on individual decisions, as well as any correlation between the terms  + ` and ,a' and 
other determinants of membership.  Thus measurement error in the proxy  Q creates a potential 
source  of  bias  beyond  the  threat  of  omitted  factors  correlated  with  both  the  true,  idiosyncratic 
treatment effect, , and the sustained adoption decision.  We take up these considerations below. 
Before turning to estimation of equation (5.1), we validate this measure by comparing the quantile 
treatment effects estimated in Figure 3 to the mean value of  Q for individuals in a neighborhood of 
the same vigintile, as was done with retention rates above.  For example, we compare the quantile 
treatment effect at the 5
th percentile of the outcome distribution among the treated, D, to the 
mean value of the individual measure    Q between the 2.5
th and the 7.5
th percentiles of the treated 
                                                            
13 The advantage of using two period changes, rather than one period changes, as predictors is that if lagged 
output realizations affect current adoption decisions (Foster & Rosenzweig 2010), the latter would be a biased 
estimate of the ATT.  However, we have replicated the results with the one period change, and they are not 
substantially affected. 19 
 
population.  If the perfect positive dependence assumption holds – so that quantile treatment effects 
can be interpreted as the average response at that quantile – and if our proxy is a relatively precise 
estimate of the individual treatment effect, then the two measures should correlate closely.  Figure 5 
shows the relationship between these outcome measures for vigintiles of the outcome distribution 
among the treated.  The measures of these two measures of impact are indeed closely related; they 
have a correlation coefficient of 0.76.     
Figure 5.  Validating alternative measures of impact:  
quantile treatment effects versus mean two period changes 
 
Notes:  Horizontal axis is defined two period change in cocoa output among treated farmers.  The local average 
of this measure within a neighborhood of a given vigintile (20 quantile) is plotted against the corresponding 
quantile treatment effect. 
Given the evidence to support this measure,  Q, of individual treatment effects, we turn to estimation 
of equation (5.1).  Probit marginal effects are presented in Table 4, which restricts attention to farmers 
who have joined Abrabopa in the first year of exposure in their village.  The dependent variable in all 
specifications is the farmer’s membership decision in the second year of exposure, which we observe 
through  administrative  records.    In  column  (1),  we  demonstrate  a  positive  relationship  between  a 
farmer’s gain in output over the two year period ending in their first year of membership and their 
membership decision in the second year.  This effect is substantial.  The standard deviation of the two 
period change in output among the estimating sample of those who join Abrabopa is approximately 816 
kg.    This implies  that  a one  standard  deviation  increase  in  this  measure  of  the  treatment  effect  is 
associated with a 13 percent increase in the likelihood of remaining in the program. 
As mentioned above, this statistical association may be a biased estimate of the causal effect of (shocks 
to) individual returns to adoption on the membership renewal decision either because the proxy for 
individual returns employed introduces other factors correlated with the error term 0	
, or because 
the true idiosyncratic treatment effect is correlated with other (possibly unobserved) determinants of 20 
 
second year membership decisions.  We can address one aspect of this – namely, the bias that would 
arise if the change in village level productivity, + `, is correlated with the unobserved component of 
individual choices, 0	
 – by including the mean two period change in output among those who did 











where b' is the number of first year non adopters in village  and year  in our sample.  As shown in 
column  (2)  of  Table  4,  the  point  estimate  of  the  marginal  effect  of  individual  ’s  return  on  her 
subsequent membership decision is unaffected by inclusion of this variable.  This suggests that the term 
+ ` is unlikely to be a substantial source of bias in our proxy for individual returns. 
Table 4.  Individual output gains and program retention 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
              
two period change in output ( Q)   0.161**  0.158***  0.146**  0.185**  0.354** 
  (0.066)  (0.058)  (0.071)  (0.087)  (0.151) 
village  non adopters’ mean change in output ( Q
'  )  0.045  0.072  0.068  0.132 
(0.214) (0.189) (0.189)  (0.215)
1{respondent failed to repay}   0.703***   0.720***   0.810*** 
(0.061) (0.062)  (0.043)
1{other member failed to repay}   0.449**   0.415*   0.312 
(0.204) (0.216)  (0.283)
cocoa, kg (   0.048   0.005 
  (0.035)  (0.055) 
 
Observations  140  140  107  107  81 
Probit marginal effects reported, evaluated at mean values.  Outcome is a dummy variable equal to 1 if first year 
member in year  continued membership in year ) .  Output variables , 
' , and  rescaled by dividing by 
1,000 prior to estimation.  All specifications include dummy variables for survey round.  Column (5) contains controls 
for age, gender, education, household size, and farm size.  Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at village 
level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Given  the  group  liability  structure  of  the  Cocoa  Abrabopa  Association,  one  might  worry  that  the 
apparent effect of idiosyncratic returns on membership renewal is driven by repayment failures on the 
part of the member herself or by another member of her group.  In such a case, it is Abrabopa’s policy – 
albeit imperfectly enforced – to exclude all group members for one season.  This is a confounding factor 
for our desired test of the hypothesis that farmers are learning from realizations of idiosyncratic returns, 
and making decisions accordingly.   
To address this concern, in column (3) of Table 4, we include dummy variables that take a value of one if 
the  member  herself  or  any  of  her  peers  failed  to  repay.    Unsurprisingly,  both  of  these  are  highly 
significant.    Failure  to  repay,  conditional  on  the  change  in  output,  results  in  a  further  70  percent 21 
 
decrease  in  the  likelihood  of  renewed  membership.
14    Repayment  failures  by  one  or  more  fellow 
members of the same group (excluding the individual under consideration herself) are associated with a 
further decline in the likelihood of sustained membership of approximately 45 percent.  However, the 
inclusion of these additional controls does not substantially alter the point estimate of the association 
between our measures of treatment effects and retention rates.    
There  are  at  least  two  mechanisms  through  which  realized  returns  could  affect  future  adoption 
decisions.  On the one hand, if returns vary across farmers and are not known with certainty, farmers 
might  update  their  beliefs  about  their  idiosyncratic  returns  to  adoption  on  the  basis  of  these 
realizations.    This  mechanism  we  refer  to  as  persistent  heterogeneity.    On  the  other  hand,  as 
emphasized  by  Dercon  and  Christiaensen,  poor  realizations  of  returns  might  deter  farmers  from 
undertaking risky investments in the following periods, simply because they deplete farmers’ buffer 
stocks and so their ability to undertake risk increasing investments (Dercon & Christiaensen 2007).  This 
is  one  mechanism  underlying  Foster  and  Rosenzweig’s  assertion  that,  when  credit  and  insurance 
markets are imperfect, “lagged shocks to profits affect current input choices” (Foster & Rosenzweig 
2010).     Dercon and Christiaensen’s mechanism links realized returns to subsequent adoption decisions 
even if all farmers returns are drawn from the same distribution.  These two mechanisms have very 
different policy implications:  whereas persistent heterogeneity implies that adoption is not optimal for 
some farmers, the buffer stock mechanism suggests that interventions insuring farmers against some of 
the risks associated with technology adoption would encourage (welfare improving) adoption. 
Notice that the buffer stock mechanism does not relate the return to adoption, per se, with subsequent 
decisions.  Instead it is the level of income in one period that effects the adoption decision.  In a pure 
version of this story, where all farmers have the same return to adoption, the counterfactual outcome is 
irrelevant.  Stronger yet, all past realizations of output – by virtue of helping the accumulation of buffer 
stocks – should be positively correlated with future adoption decisions.  This suggests a simple test 
between the two mechanisms:  to simply augment the specification in equation (5.1) with the current 
level of income.  Conditional on current income, if the difference  Q remains positively associated with 
adoption decisions, this lends support to the hypothesis of learning about persistent heterogeneity.  This 
is confirmed in column (4) of Table 4.  While there is no significant relationship between current output 
and subsequent adoption, the association between the difference,  Q, and adoption in the following 
year remains large and statistically significant.   
Finally, in column (5) we address the concern that idiosyncratic returns to hi tech adoption, , may 
themselves  be  correlated  with  other  variables  that  have  a  direct  effect  on  the  choice  to  sustain 
adoption.  We do so by including controls for farm size, as well as the farmer’s age, gender, education, 
and household size.  Although data availability reduces the number of observations, we find no evidence 
that the correlation between idiosyncratic returns and these observed characteristics drives the evident 
association between returns and sustained adoption choices. 
                                                            
14 The mean change in output levels among those who fail to repay is 408 kg less than among those who do repay; 
this difference is statistically significant at the 99 percent level.   22 
 
From  these  results,  we  conclude  that  the  data  are  consistent  with  a  model  in  which  individuals 
experience heterogeneous returns to participation in the Abrabopa program, and they condition their 
decisions  to  remain  within  the  program  on  these  experienced  returns.
15    The  association  between 
measures of returns and future membership decisions does not appear to be driven by the ‘supply’ of 
the  program  –  although  repayment  failures  do  cause  expulsion  in  accordance  with  the  program’s 
bylaws.  Nor is this association driven by current income alone:  those who experience greater gains 
upon joining the program are more likely to remain, even at a given level of current production.   
6 Conclusions 
In many developing countries, the persistent adoption of agricultural technologies with high average 
returns is believed to be one of the principal policy challenges.  Experimental and observational studies 
documenting these high average returns have led to a puzzle:  why, if returns are so high, do farmers 
not adopt – and sustain – the use of agricultural technologies such as fertilizer or hybrid seeds?   
We  have  presented  evidence  consistent  with  the  view  that  high  average  returns  mask  substantial, 
persistent  heterogeneity  in  realized  returns.    Farmers  at  the  low  end  of  the  distribution  of  cocoa 
production exhibit particularly low returns – so much so that we are unable to reject a zero economic 
return for the bottom quarter of the distribution.  We have shown evidence to support the view that 
this heterogeneity matters, economically speaking:  farmers exhibiting low returns, by various measures, 
are less likely to continue use of the technology.   
This ex post heterogeneity likely reflects a combination of persistent heterogeneity and time varying 
riskiness  of  returns.    Both  may  have  consequences  for  decisions  to  sustain  or  to  disadopt  a  given 
technology.  Farmers may experiment in order to learn about their specific, time varying component.  
Time varying  shocks  to  these  returns  may  lead  Bayesian  farmers  astray.    But  they  may  also  affect 
adoption decisions directly, either because they lead to non repayment of loans, or because they force 
farmers to deplete buffer stocks of savings, or social or other forms of collateral, in order to repay.  In 
our  data  and  context,  there  is  some  evidence  that  the  latter  effect  is  not  driving  the  relationship 
between realized returns and disadoption:  our measure of realized returns retains its statistical and 
economic significance even after conditioning on the level of past output.   
The distinction between the effect of transient and persistent heterogeneity in returns seems a valuable 
area for future work.  If persistent heterogeneity is quantitatively important, policymakers will need to 
be cautious in advocating widespread adoption of such technologies.  Even when average returns are 
high, many farmers may stand to lose.   
                                                            
15  Sustained  membership  in  Abrabopa  is  not  equivalent  to  sustained  use  of  the  technology  it  provides.  
Examination of whether treatment heterogeneity correlates with  continued use of the hi tech package is not 
possible in this context, since we observe only whether broad categories of inputs such as fertilizer were used, but 
not their exact make or proportions on a given plot; moreover, we only have these production data for 29 of the 
first year members in our sample who subsequently drop out of Abrabopa.  Among these 29 farmers, 14 report 
using fertilizer in some form and quantity.   23 
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